Last Friday Kingboard Copper Foil Holdings Limited (SGX:K14) announced that Excel First Investment Limited had placed a cash tender offer at 0,40 SGD for the shares in K14. Excel First is an subsidiary to the parent company Kingboard Laminates Holdings Ltd. (listed on Hong Kong stock exchange) which is also the parent company of K14 (owns 66,01 % of K14). Before the cash tender offer was announced the shares of K14 traded at 0,34 SGD (+17,7% tender offer premium) and after the announcement the stock is trading at 0,415 SGD, I will come back to both of these facts later in the post. If you read my analysis of K14 that i published in mid January you will notice that this development was not a lightning strike from a clear blue sky. Although, I had anticipated an offer first after the result of an legal appeal in March 2017 and that company would directly make use of its then newly implemented 10 % buyback mandate. I will come back to both of these factors later in the post as well. According to the offer announcement the reason behind the offer is to delist K14 from the Singapore stock exchange. In other words, the intentions are to privatize the company (this is an important factor to take with you when reading this post).
Does K14 still pass my net-net checklist requirements?
Yes, I have concluded that K14 still passes my net-net checklist without any difficulties. To the contrary, since I analysed the company in January the company has published its FY report for 2016. As of this report the company is posting good revenue growth, it is still profitable on the bottom level and the company is still debt free. Also, the net current asset value (NCAV) per share has increased from 2,09 HKD to 3,02 HKD, an increase of 45% (notice that the reporting currency is HKD but the stock is traded in SGD). In relation to the share price development of 51 % since I bought my position at 0,275 SGD, the 45 % NCAV increase has translated into an P/NCAV-multiple that is almost unchanged (P/NCAV = 0,72 vs P/NCAV = 0,75x). In other words, the margin of safety in relation to NCAV is the same even though the share price has increased 51 % since I bought my position. From the checklist point of view I will therefore not be “required” to sell my position. On the other hand, I don’t want/allow myself to be an owner of a private Singapore company so lets review what options that I currently have at my disposal for closing the K14 position.
Options for closing the K14 position
The way I see it I have three options:
- I can tender my shares at the 0,40 SGD cash offer. With this option I won’t have any transaction costs for the sale of my position.
- I can sell my position at the market price of 0,415 SGD. With this option I will have transaction costs of about 1 % but I will also gain about 3,8 % above the 0,40 SGD offer.
- The third alternative requires me to sit tight and wait for the results of the Court of Appeal in Bermuda that takes place March 6 and 7 2017 (yesterday and today) which might result in an increased tender or buyout offer.
I believe the third option needs a more in depth explanation than option 1 and 2… Before presenting my facts and arguments for option 3 here is short sales pitch for that alternative:
In my opinon there exist a high probability that the result of the appeal will not be in favor of the holding company of K14 (the defendants/majority shareholders of K14) and that this in turn may require them to increase the cash tender offer to ~0,67 SGD if they want to take the company private. In other words, I would argue that there is a potential +61% return on the table to take advantage of. That’s not even the best part, if I’m wrong in my analysis I can still tender my shares at the 0,40 SGD cash offer (option 1) without any transaction costs and only incur a small loss of -3,8%. I think Mr Market is aware of this potential outcome and that is why the company today is selling above the cash tender offer (0,40 SGD) on the market. So obviously I have chosen option 3 (in potential combination with option 1).
Explanation for the sit-tight-and-wait-option (Nr. 3)
As I presented in the analysis in January there has been a legal process going on since 2011. I won’t go into the history of the legal process as this has in been explained in detail by the blog ThumbTackInvestor and also in the articles linked to in my earlier analysis. But in short terms the legal process i about:
Kingboard Copper Foil entered into a license agreement with Harvest Resource Management after the Petitioner (Annuity & Re Life Ltd) had vetoed the proposed general mandate for interested person transactions at the AGM of the Company on 29 April 2011.
which has resulted in that:
The Supreme Court of Bermuda found that, as the majority shareholders failed to promptly initiate negotiations with the minority shareholders with a view to resolving the impasse and take into account the interests of shareholders as a whole following the blocking of the IPT Mandate, the license agreement was a commercially prejudicial means of enabling the Company to circumvent the Petitioner’s legitimate exercise of its right to veto the IPT Mandate.
What is more important to know is that the petitioners of the legal process is the company Annuity & Life Reassurance LTD. This company is a subsidiary of Pope Investments II LLC under which another company, Pope Asset Management LLC, can also be found. The Petitioner’s holdings in K14 together with those of the two Pope entities amounted to 80,251,528 shares by July 18, 2011 according to this supreme court judgement. Its is this judgement and the findings therein that the defendants, mainly Kingboard Chemicals and Kingboard Laminates, are appealing against as I write this post (March 6 and 7). It is important to note that K14 is only a third party in this legal process, and will therefor not bear any litigation costs or liability.
In relation to the above linked supreme court judgement the consultancy firm Ernst and Young (EY) was appointed to conduct an independent review. The independent review was presented in October 2016 with the outcome that supported the supreme court judgment. This is one of the main reason why I in my earlier analysis of K14 stated that the appeal is not likely to result in favor of the defendants. What was then unknown was how the case would play out for the minority shareholders that were not appealing in court and those who hadn’t signed a form as of 7 April 2016 stating that they would like there shares to be redeemed under the same conditions as the petitioner (the Pope entities). With the current cash tender offer of 0,40 SGD with the purpose of taking K14 private we now know a bit more. But now to the really interesting part of the whole situation.
In the cash tender offer announcement the following can be found:
Requirements for delisting:
Under Rule 1303(1) of the Listing Manual, if the Offeror succeeds in garnering acceptances exceeding 90% of the total number of Shares in issue excluding treasury Shares, thus causing the percentage of the total number of Shares in issue held in public hands to fall below 10%, the SGX-ST will suspend trading of the Shares on the SGX-ST at the close of the Offer.
In connection to this requirement for delisting we can read the same thing but from a compulsory acquisition point of view and the value of shares:
Compulsory acquisition:
- (a) obtained acceptances from shareholders holding not less than 90% in value of the shares in a Bermuda-incorporated company (“Target”) whose transfer is involved (other than shares already held, at the date of the offer, by the offeror, the offeror’s subsidiaries, and nominees of the offeror or its subsidiaries)
Finally, there is the 95% ownership level which would enable them to not only take K14 private but also entitles and binds them to acquire the remaining 5 % at 0,40 SGD tender offer:
Under Section 103 of the Bermuda Companies Act, the holders of not less than 95% of the shares in a Bermuda-incorporated company (“Purchasers”) may give notice (“Section 103 Acquisition Notice”) to the remaining shareholders of the intention to acquire their shares on the terms set out in the Section 103 Acquisition Notice. When such Section 103 Acquisition Notice is given, the Purchasers will be entitled and bound to acquire the shares of the remaining shareholders on the terms set out in the Section 103 Acquisition Notice unless a remaining shareholder applies to the Court to have the Court appraise the value of such shares.
So to summarize and conclude so far, if the parent company of K14 don’t manage to acquire more than 90 % of K14 it will fail in its intentions to take the company private. This notion translates into two milliondollar questions:
- Can the parent company acquire more than 90 % of K14?
- If the parent company fails to acquire more than 90 % of K14, what will then happen?
Can the parent company acquire more than 90 % of K14?
According to the cash tender offer announcement the parent company has control, direct and indirect, over 66,01 % of K14 (se picture one below). Indirect they also have control over another 10 % if we take into account full use of the company’s buyback mandate. Finally, if the Pope entities have their 11,1 % holding redeemed, the parent company will have the control over 87,11 % of the shares in K14. In other words, the parent company is relying on the cash tender offer and that it brings in another 2,9 %. Thats is, if the parent company manage to make full use of the buyback mandate, otherwise the tender offer will have to be more successful than just 2,9%. As of the pre cash tender offer announcement there have been no signs of the buyback mandate put to use. If we make the bold assumption that the 12,618,000 shares traded yesterday (well above the average trading volume of 15,000,00 shares) were all acquired via the buyback mandate they would just have managed to vacuum up 1,7%. In other words, if we hold my bold hypothesis true for the coming days it will take at about two weeks for the company to make full use of the buyback mandate. It should be noted that I don’t think it is very likely or fair assumption but more importantly, the volume of shares traded will most likely to decrease in the following days (i.e. the portion of shares that the company can potentially acquire per day is well below 1,7%). This assumption was already obvious today when only ~1,700,000 shares have been traded (0,2 %).
So to summarize and conclude, YES the parent company can theoretically acquire more than 90 %. However, I find it not very likely given what we know today and it will most certainly not happen over a night. Instead, I would argue that the current cash tender offer (0,40 SGD) is to much of a low ball offer to give minority shareholders the incentive to sell their share at the market or to tender their shares (i.e. the company will have a hard time putting its 10 % buyback mandate to use but also in succeeding to acquire another 2,9 % via the cash tender offer). Also, the fact that the appeal and the valuation for the redemption of the Pope entities holding is not jet decided upon I believe that many minority shareholders, me included, will sit tight in the boat and wait for the outcome of the court appeal. Together this leads us into the question of; what will then happen?
Option Nr. 4 – The special situation case for K14
When I started to write this follow-up post I had not thought about the idea of acquiring more shares in K14 (this is the reason I postponed the post). However, I have come to realize that K14 has morphed into a very attractive special situation case. I have therefor increased my position in K14 under the special situations heading, not as an increased checklist net-net investment. As a result I therefor extend my earlier three options decision framework for closing the K14 position to include a fourth option. What I present below is options 4 – the special situations case for K14.
To start, I don’t believe it’s a coincidence that the cash tender offer at 0,40 SGD was announced last Friday. This belief is mainly related to the fact that the earlier mentioned appeal takes place March 6 and 7 and 2017 and that this will most likely, due to the EY report, result in favor of the petitioner (i.e the Pope entities). Also, as pointed out earlier there is still no announcement regarding the valuation at which the petitioners holding is to be redeemed at. This will most likely be announced in the connection of the appeal outcome. I would argue that the price the petitioner will be offered is well above 0,40 SGD. I would also argue that the minimum price is around 0,67 SGD since this represent the equity per share as of 31 December 2016 for K14. It might even be higher as a result of the company being profitable and debt free but also that the valuation will probably take into account loss of earnings as a result of the misconduct by the defendants.
Furthermore, one should note and be aware of that the defendants are charged under section 111. This translates into what is know as a “Class Remedy” for all shareholders. In plain English, the redemption of shares at a value jet unknown, but probably at the minimum of 0,67 SGD, is in theory not only applicable to the Pope entities and the shareholders that signed the 7 April 2016 form but in fact all minority shareholders. However, it is a bit unclear to me if the class remedy also holds true for investors that has become shareholders after the legal process started back in 2011 or not. What confuses me, as I’m not legal expert, are these two quotes that can be found in the supreme court judgment earlier referred to:
Statement from the court: “However, as I have already found above, the Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief in respect of shares in the Company purchased after the presentation of the Petition on August 3, 2011.” (p.85)
Statement from the respondents lawyer: “Mr Wong SC did not dispute the argument that section 111 is fundamentally a class remedy. In principle it seems to me that all minority shareholders must have a right to be heard at the relief stage of the present Petition.” (p.85)
However, lets say that the first quote is true and that is how the court is going to decided upon which shares get redeemed at the not jet disclosed valuation level. In that case, I would argue that this in fact doesn’t really matter for how the whole situation is going to play out for other minority shareholders like myself. I would argue that the 0,40 SGD is to much of an low ball offer to get minority shareholder exited and that the sneaky attempt by management to fool minority investors in order to attain the +90 % position needed to take the K14 private is not going to succeed, as discussed before. In other words, we may very well see an increased cash tender offer or an buyout offer at the same price as the redemption of shares for the Pope entities even though we might not legally be entitled to it. This in order for the parent company to succeed in acquiring the shares needed to delist the company and take it private, all according to its stated intentions.
Even if i’m drastically mistaken or wrong in my above probability guesstimates, reasoning and argumentation this is still an very favorable special situations bet. Reson being that at the current price of 0,415 SGD there is an estimated minimum upside of 61 % (0,67 SGD) at the same time as the downside is limited to -3,8 % (i.e. the 0,40 SGD price at which I can cash tender my shares). I think Mohnish Pabrai would would let me use the phrase “heads I win tails I don’t lose much” without to much complaints in this case.
Disclosure: The author is long SGX:K14 when this analysis is published. Also note that SGX:K14 is a micro-cap stock (173 M$ in market capitalization). The trading is illiquid.
Cigarrfimpar 